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Climate change, migration and the crisis of humanism 
 
Abstract 
 
Climate change is more and more said to be a problem of migration. The common refrain is that climate 
change will bear in some way on patterns of human mobility, resulting in either insecurity, humanitarian 
crises or all manner of inventive adaptive responses. The inherent challenge in such claims is, 
however, that of causality: the degree to which climate change influences migration alongside the 
myriad social, political and economic reasons people migrate. This challenge is far from being settled. 
Importantly, the unsettled question of causality exposes how the crisis of humanism is central to the 
construction of the climate migrant or climate refugee. Coming to terms with this crisis means having to 
confront how issues of power and knowledge shape how we understand the relationship between 
climate change and migration. But even more importantly it means having to ask probing questions 
about what it means to be human today.  The paper develops these arguments through an engagement 
with the concept of the monster and with Timothy Morton’s concept of the hyperobject.  
 
Keywords: climate change, migration, humanism, power, knowledge 
 
Human migration is often said to be one of the many social consequences of climate change. This 
refrain reappears endlessly in media and political rhetorics exhorting us to mitigate climate change or 
else risk mass migration. It figures within academic statements that reassert the ‘climate refugee’ as a 
legitimate category in the politics and policy of climate change 1. And it enjoys mounting visibility in 
climate change policy where human migration, displacement and settlement are increasingly said to be 
emergent phenomena that demand technical and expert solutions.   
This brief intervention interprets the discourse on climate change and migration rather 
differently. It argues that, however well-intentioned, mounting concern for human migration in the 
context of climate change is less about governing ‘the other’ of climate change (i.e., ‘climate refugees’ 
or ‘climate migrants’) than it is about resuscitating humanism at the very conjuncture that climate 
change calls humanism into question. This claim rests on the idea that the ‘climate migrant’ or ‘climate 
refugee’ does not name an actually existing person or phenomenon but is instead a very powerful 
fiction that serves to stabilise or fix the ideology of humanism at a particular moment in planetary history 
when humanity’s presumed power over biophysical and geophysical processes is no longer the surety 
it once might have been. My point is not, however, that the climate migrant or climate refugee is simply 
the ‘other’ of climate change and thus subject to the exclusionary logics of modernism. It is, rather, that 
the figurative presence of the migrant or refugee in the discourse on climate change gives meaning to 
humanism amidst the ontologically destabilising presence of climate change. In this way, I propose that 
the widely popular discourse of climate change and migration is symptomatic of what some in the 
interpretive social sciences call the crisis of humanism 2, a condition of anxiety that results when the 
foundational tenets of humanism seem no longer tenable.  
 
The crisis of humanism in brief 
 
Among the foundational tenets of modern thought is the belief that Man possessed the capacity to 
control Nature. This belief figures centrally within genres of humanist thought in which the human is 
said to be unique amongst all other living and non-living entities. Reason, it was said, is what set the 
human apart from the non-human, and reason, properly deployed through science and art, would allow 
the human total mastery of space (Nature) and time (History). Indeed, one of the core ideas of 
humanist thought is the notion that humans are the agents of world history. Modern European 
philosophers like John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, Immanuel Kant all located human subjectivity and reason 
at the centre of their worldviews, even while such views were all radically different. The idea that 
humans are the agents of history reached its apogee in the experience of European colonialism when 
European states sought mastery over the colonised world. And in respect of Europe’s colonial history 
and aftermath it is important to remember that not all humans have been admitted equally into the 
category of the human 3-5.   
But with climate change, belief in human mastery of Nature is called into question. For climate 
change exemplifies the recurring modern trope of Nature’s return This is the inconvenient idea that 
nature is not simply available to human manipulation without consequence, but contains the ever-
present capacity to overwhelm humans. This is the idea that in spite of our efforts to limit greenhouse 
gas emissions, climate change is an accelerating geophysical phenomenon that exceeds human 
control, even while humans are its cause. It is what William Cronon (1996) long ago called ‘nature as 
the demonic other, nature as the avenging angel, nature as the return of the repressed.’6 In this sense, 
we might say that climate change is a particular instance of the crisis of humanism. It embodies the 
dawning realisation that Nature is an uncontainable force, the realisation that human distinctiveness 
from Nature was only ever a provisional belief, and even then a provisional belief confined only to 
European thought. Climate change forces us to confront our faith in reason. There is, of course, nothing 
exceptional about climate change in this regard. Whether in the form of an earthquake, tsunami or 
disease, Nature’s return has always been an ever present feature of modern human society and 
therefore philosophy 7.     
Contemporary debates in philosophy, the humanities and interpretive social sciences have 
been grappling with these issues for quite some time. Under the broad heading of ‘posthumanism,’ 
much of this philosophical enquiry has entailed charting the various ways that human distinctiveness 
from Nature, and indeed human control over Nature, is an artefact of the ideology of humanism 8, 9. 
Bruno Latour 10 has been at the forefront of this philosophical exercise, arguing against the ‘modern 
constitution’ that divides human society from the natural world. So too the geographer Sarah Whatmore 
11, for example, has been instrumental in arguing that human societies are always ‘more-than-human’. 
What these philosophies amount to is the idea that what we understand to be ‘the human’ – a self-
contained, bounded entity, internal to itself, governed by internal reason, and possessed of the capacity 
to shape the world to suit his/her needs – is a fiction. According to posthumanist philosophy, the human 
is best understood as relational, or that being human is in equal measure a function of human agency 
and the agency of ‘things’ 12, everything from microbes and Big Data all the way up to the global climate 
system. It is in this sense that we can say that humanism is in crisis. Its apparent foundations appear to 
have been washed away. 
Timothy Morton’s 13-15 concept of the ‘hyperobject’ offers a unique take on this sense of crisis. 
Morton describes hyperobjects as real, nonlocal “entities whose primordial reality is withdrawn from 
humans.” These are phenomena that transcend and saturate human experience without ever being 
singular. They stretch our experience beyond the time scales of immediate daily life but, in doing so, 
hyperobjects are unfathomable and induce in us a sense of the uncanny. Styrofoam is a good example 
of a hyperobject. All the Styrofoam ever manufactured persists in the geophysical environment well 
beyond the immediacy of a single Styrofoam cup. Its totality accumulates as a form of waste that vastly 
exceeds the timescale of a single human life, which is kind of freaky when you really stop and think 
about it.  The “sum of all the whirring machinery of capitalism” (p.1) is another good example of a 
hyperobject, a vast incomprehensible matrix operating simultaneously at the scale of the nanosecond 
(i.e., high frequency trading) and the generational scale (i.e., the time required to negotiate and 
implement a trade agreement). The ‘atmosphere’ in the City of London, for example, is thick with the 
uncanny, ungraspable hyperobjectivity of capitalism.  
Climate change is also a hyperobject (although Morton prefers the term ‘global warming’). 
Climate change is real, but its realness is largely withdrawn from human view. Instead, we observe the 
realness of climate change through various proxies, like modelling or the image of thousands of 
icebergs afloat in the Arctic Ocean. We can never come into direct contact with climate change, like we 
can a rock, for example, and yet we know its realness through simulation. Its realness from the vantage 
of the present is not so much actual as it is virtual, which is another way of saying that its realness 
evades our immediate cognition. Moreover, we might be able to pinpoint the causes of climate change, 
but its effects will long outlive all current human life by centuries. Most importantly, though, given their 
inescapable yet withdrawn presence, hyperobjects, for Morten, “cause us to reflect on our very place on 
Earth and the cosmos”, “they force something on us, something affects some core ideas of what it 
means to exist, what Earth is, what society is.” (p.15) Hyperobjects are a reminder that the world is not 
a plastic surface that can be reformed in our likeness, but that nonlocal phenomena, like climate 
change, shift what it means to be human by inducing within us a sense of the uncanny. Our experience 
in the world becomes unfathomable when we begin to think about hyperobjects. My contention is that 
the figure of the climate change migrant or climate refugee is a construct whose purpose is to stabilise 
the human at a world-historical moment when the hyperobectivity of our world calls into question the 
very tenets of humanism.  
 
Climate change and migration  
 
Migration is by now a dominant narrative within the wider political discourse of climate change 16-19. 
Figuring across a full range of policy discussions, migration in the context of climate change has been 
linked to security 20, humanitarianism 21, adaptation 22, risk management 23, and trapped populations 24, 
25. Here is not the place to review the full scope of the discourse. Suffice to say, however, that migration 
figures increasingly within the broad domain of international climate change governance in both the 
IPCC 26 and in recently adopted Paris Agreement 27. Climate change and migration is also an area of 
work in numerous other United Nations agencies, including the International Organization for Migration 
28 and the UN High Commission for Refugees 29.  
Several features of the discourse on climate change and migration do, however, warrant 
mention as they are central to the argument that the discourse is less concerned with governing the 
other of climate change than with resuscitating waning humanism. The first and most important feature 
of the discourse is that the phenomenon it purports to name is not directly observable. Migration 
decisions are irreducible to climate change, and are as much to do with unequal access to land and 
capital, gender inequality, colonial history, structural political economy and war as they are with 
environmental considerations. This insight is hardly controversial. It is foundational to the discourse and 
figures centrally in all manner of academic and policy research, including the IPCC. This is not to deny 
that climatic variation exists or that the impacts of climate change bear on migration decisions, now or 
in the future. Nor is it to deny any plausible correlation between migrant flows and models of climate 
change. It is simply to acknowledge that climate change cannot be isolated as any more or less 
significant than these others factors in explaining migration. As such, ‘climate change-induced 
migration’ does not correspond to any actually existing phenomenon in the world. To be more precise, 
one cannot point to any particular migrant or refugee and claim that he or she is a climate refugee. 
Doing so would immediately run into the counter claim which is that migration is irreducible to climate 
change. So when we talk about ‘climate migrants’ or ‘climate refugees’ we are in effect inventing a 
category that corresponds with how we imagine the world to be, not one that describes the world as it 
really is. In this sense, we can say that the figures of the climate migrant or climate refugee are socially 
constructed phenomenon. The political underpinnings of this disjuncture between image and reality are 
legion 18. Most notably, the actual everyday experiences of those deemed to be climate migrants and 
refugees become masked, in turn, obscuring the real political contexts that mark daily life in those 
places.  
 This leads to the second important point which is to do with power and knowledge. More 
specifically, it concerns the power to represent migration as a function of climate change and the 
concomitant power to label someone a climate refugee or a climate change migrant. Often when these 
categories are invoked, those who invoke them do so with the very best of intentions: to reveal the real 
human face of climate change. Climate change is for many a vast injustice. The categories of the 
‘climate refugee’ and the ‘climate migrant’ are a means of rendering climate change less an abstract 
hyperobject and more one that bears directly on human experience. Giving face to those supposedly 
displaced by climate change becomes a very powerful means of appealing to wider publics concerned 
with climate change. This is a humanitarian appeal. And yet in many of the places where we would 
expect these categories to find their greatest traction, for example in low lying island states, instead we 
find citizens of these states either actively refusing such labelling or prioritizing a range of other factors 
that might influence their decision to migrate with climate change a very low priority. In Kiribati, for 
example, the i-Kiribati have adopted a policy of ‘migration with dignity’, which attempts to resettle the i-
Kiribati through actively negotiating with neighbouring states the terms of entry and settlement 30. This 
is a policy partially informed by the post-colonial thinker Epeli Hau’ofa 31, who re-imagines Oceania 
through the collective solidarity of the Pacific islands. It is also one that refuses the trope of the helpless 
victim which is synonymous with notions like ‘climate refugee’ and ‘climate migrant’ as well as with the 
ideology of colonial intervention. Or take another example, the Maldives, which is often said to be on 
the frontline of climate change; its inhabitants will have no choice but to relocate. Recent research, 
however, suggests that climate change is not a prime reason for migrating from the Maldives 32, 33. 
Maldivians are far more likely to cite improvements to their socio-economic condition as the reason they 
might migrate. Much has been said about these two examples. But for the purpose of the present 
argument, both are important because they expose the power asymmetries that shape the discourse on 
climate change and migration. A similar observation can be made in relation to security. All too often 
the so-called ‘climate refugee’ or ‘climate migrant’ is said to threaten various forms of security. In such 
accounts, often promulgated by militaries and national security agencies, the climate migrant or climate 
refugee is said to catalyse political violence. Nowadays the Syrian civil war is held up as evidence of 
this quite dubious relation. In the recent past, the conflict in Darfur was often tainted by a similar claim. 
We know, however, that the claim that climate-induced migrations catalyses war rests on quite spurious 
evidence and is far from conclusive 34, 35.  
 At issue in these two observations – the social constructedness of climate migrants and climate 
refugees and the power to represent people using these constructs – is the relationship between power 
and knowledge. For the purpose of this argument, the nature of this relationship is not, however, the 
idea that knowledge is power, or that if one possesses knowledge then one also possesses power. It is, 
rather, the idea that power is exercised through the very construction of knowledge 36. In this sense, 
when one makes the claim that ‘climate change is a problem of migration’ one is already privileging 
specific forms of knowledge, such as climate modelling and population distributions and dynamics 37, 
over and above, say, knowledge about the role that the socio-psychological and affective dimensions of 
place attachment play in migration decision making 25. That is, specific kinds of knowledge produce an 
account of climate-migration dynamics that mask or subjugate other forms of knowledge. The abstract 
knowledges of climate modelling and demographics attain greater significance and therefore diminish 
the validity of other forms of knowledge, such as place attachment. And as Helen Adams 25 argues, this 
matters greatly, especially where it concerns the types of knowledge that governments use when 
deciding on the liveability of a place and whether to encourage its inhabitants to migrate. The risk, of 
course, is that local knowledges become secondary to governmental imperatives, a risk with far-
reaching consequences for often the most marginalised people.  
 
Climate change, migration and the restoration of humanism 
   
If those for whom the categories of ‘climate refugee’ and ‘climate migrant’ were invented refuse such 
labelling or downplay climate change as a reason to migrate, then one must ask: for whom is the 
discourse on climate change and migration? Why do the categories ‘climate migrant’ or ‘climate 
refugee’ persist even while refused by those they are apparently designed to assist? It could be that 
these categories reveal more about those who use them then about the people they are meant to 
describe. To help us think this through, let us turn to a very unlikely category: monsters. Monsters are 
figures that exceed the normal, gruesome disfigurements of the human form, figures that Jane and 
Lewis Gordon 38 tell us are the survivors of disaster. And more than simply survivors, monsters are 
made to signify the symptoms of disaster. That is, monsters signify the crisis of values that led to the 
disaster. But, as Jane and Lewis Gordon also remind us, all too often we fail to the heed the warnings 
that monsters signify, displacing instead onto monsters our inability or refusal to respond collectively to 
the crisis of values from which monsters are said to emerge. We feel compelled to control and manage 
the monster, rather than use the monster as an opportunity to reflect on the crisis of values to which it 
gives rise, or rather to reflect on our values.  
My wager is that something similar is at stake in the discourse of climate change and human 
mobility. I would argue that the figure of the climate migrant or climate refugee is a kind of monstrous 
figure, that such a figure exceeds our comprehension. Not unlike Morton’s hyperobject, which can 
never actually be seen, we can never know what a climate migrant actually is. It cannot be neatly 
captured by any form of objective understanding. Much like the figure of abnormality in mediaeval 
Europe which was said to be monstrous and thus outside the law 39, so too the figure of the ‘climate 
refugee’ and ‘climate migrant’ occupies a legal non-space inasmuch as neither are proper legal terms 
40. And yet this has not stopped us from mobilising the figure of the climate migrant or refugees across 
a range of epistemic domains from security to humanitarianism, from law to cinema. All the time, we 
hear claims like ‘people will need to move as a result of climate change, so we need to devise policies 
that are aimed at ensuring their movements are orderly, humane and not chaotic.’ And I would argue 
here that when we express the desire to manage human mobility in the context of climate change we 
are in effect displacing onto climate change migrants our inability to come to terms with the existential 
crisis brought about by the hyperobjectivity ofclimate change. In others words, in our inability to cope 
with our internal crisis of values – that our lives, worlds, political concepts, and desires are shaped by 
fossil fuels, the very thing that is our undoing - we displace this anxiety onto the other of climate change 
– the climate migrant - who we then seek to manage and control. 
Ultimately, then, my claim is that the discourse on climate change and migration is less about 
managing the other of climate change than it is about shoring up a waning European or Western 
humanism. At a moment in our collective planetary history, one marked by profound environmental, 
economic and geopolitical uncertainty, the figure of the climate migrant or climate refugee offers a point 
of reference, one that ameliorates what Derek Gregory 41 calls ‘cartographic anxiety’, the feeling of 
waywardness that underpins the impulse to map. This is a discourse conjured by and for a range of 
epistemic communities and institutions, whether well-intentioned academics, humanitarians, and 
activists, military elites tasked with identifying new and emerging threats, or novelists and filmmakers 
who use the figure to tell us stories about ourselves. Even though ungraspable, much like an optical 
illusion that disappears the moment you look directly at it, the figure of the ‘climate migrant’ or ‘climate 
refugee’ emerges as a figure to cling to, a figure we might save, a figure from which to defend 
ourselves, a figure onto whom we project our greatest ambitions as well as our deepest anxieties. It 
offers the (false) promise of a restored humanity. As Zygmunt Baumann 42 put it recently, writing on the 
current refugee situation in the Eastern Mediterranean: “The influx of a great number of refugees, and 
their sudden high visibility, draws to the surface fears that we are trying hard to stifle and hide: those 
fears that are gestated by the premonition of our own fragilities in society, and by the continuously 
reaffirmed suspicion that our fate is in the hands of forces far beyond our comprehension — let alone 
our control.”  
 
Conclusion 
What then is to be done? If the hyperobject of climate change forces us to confront our fragility, and, as 
I have argued, if the climate migrant or climate refugee is a merely prop for shoring up this fragility, how 
then might we respond to the not-unreasonable-claim that climate change will have some bearing on 
patterns of human mobility even if this bearing will always elude us? Perhaps what is needed is less a 
confrontation with the hyperobject of climate change, less a rushing out to save the ‘Other’ of climate 
change. Mitigating climate change ought to remain a public policy priority. But perhaps, so, too, we 
need to confront the crisis of values that the ‘Other’ of climate change signifies. Not only that our 
reliance on fossil fuels is also our undoing, but that in our rush to control the biophysical world, 
humanism never fully grasped that fossil fuels are themselves a manifestation of Nature’s return, the 
sediment of Earth’s ever-present physical volatility. Climate change is the price humanism is now forced 
to pay for neglecting this aspect of our planetary history. Consequently, perhaps, we need then is a 
more heightened ontological awareness about what it means to be human at a planetary moment when 
science has revealed to us that we inhabit a world saturated by hyperobjects. Climate science plays an 
important role in making the world available to us. But as Morton also intimates through their dispersal 
in time and space hyperobjects like climate change disclose to us ‘an abyss whose reality becomes 
increasingly uncanny, not less, the more scientific instruments are able to probe it’ (Ref. 15, p.233). 
‘Knowledge,’ for Morton, thus ‘ceases to be demystification, if it ever was’ (Ref. 15, p.233). This in turn 
suggests that the task of rethinking human ontology ought to entail confronting the abyss rather than 
stifling it through illusions such as the climate refugee. 
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